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Abstract
Blackwell games are infinite games of imperfect information. The two
players simultaneously make their moves and are then informed of each
other’s moves. Payoff is determined by a Borel measurable function f
on the set of possible resulting sequences of moves. A standard result in
Game Theory is that finite games of this type are determined. Blackwell
proved that infinite games are determined, but only for the cases where
the payoff function is the indicator function of an open or Gδ set [2, 3]. For
games of perfect information, determinacy has been proven for games of
arbitrary Borel complexity [6, 7, 8]. In this paper I prove the determinacy
of Blackwell games over a Gδσ set, in a manner similar to Davis’ proof of
determinacy of games of Gδσ complexity of perfect information [5].
There is also extensive literature about the consequences of assuming
AD, the axiom that all such games of perfect information are determined
[9, 11]. In the final section of this paper I formulate an analogous axiom
for games of imperfect information, and explore some of the consequences
of this axiom.
1 Introduction
Imagine two players playing a game of Blind Chess. The only board they have is
in their minds, and they make their moves merely by announcing them. Someone
who doesn’t know the rules would find a game like this difficult to follow. If
that someone was of a literal bend, he might describe it like this:
“There were two players, playing against each other. The first player
said something, and I was told it was her move, and that she had
made the move by saying it. The other player thought for a while,
and then announced his own move. Then the first player made a
move again, then the second player, and so forth. The moves always
sounded similar, something like ”pawn from ee-four to ee-five”. So I
think they couldn’t just say anything, but had to select their moves
∗My thanks go to Michiel van Lambalgen and Tonny Hurkens, for their guidance, ideas and
meticulous proofreading. This research was partially funded by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (NWO), under grant PGS 22-262.
2 Introduction
from only a few possible options. And suddenly they stopped, and
shook hands, and I was told that the first player had won, apparently
because of the moves she and her opponent had played.”
If no one gave the poor fellow a copy of the rules of Chess, the way a sequence
of moves determines which player wins would probably seem quite arbitrary.
And our hypothetical observer might be quite impressed that apparently chess-
players are able to memorize this long list of what the result is of each possible
sequence of moves.
Of course, the game of Chess is not really that arbitrary, and those of us
who play chess only need to know a few simple rules to figure out which player
has won. But we can use this concept of a game to construct a quite general
mathematical game Γp.i.(f).
Let there be given two finite sets X and Y , an integer n, and a
function f assigning to each sequence w of length n of pairs (xi, yi) ∈
X × Y , a payoff f(w) ∈ IR. Two players are playing against each
other. Each player, in turn, makes a move by selecting an element
x1 ∈ X or y1 ∈ Y , respectively, and announcing his or her selection.
Then they each in turn make a second move, and a third move,
and continue making moves until n rounds have been played. This
generates a sequence w of length n of pairs (xi, yi) ∈ X × Y . Then
they stop, and player II pays player I the amount f(w).
With the right choices for X , Y , n and f , the game Γp.i.(f) can ‘emulate’ the
game of Chess. For if we let X and Y be the set of all possible chess moves, and
n = 63501, then a sequence w corresponds to a finished game of chess. We now
set f(w) = 1, f(w) = 0, or f(w) = 12 , depending on whether the corresponding
game is a win for White, a win for Black, or a draw.2 And voila`, we have our
Chess emulator.
But Chess is not the only game that can be ‘emulated’ in this manner. The
same can be done with Noughts-and-Crosses, Connect-Four, Go and Checkers.
In general, the games Γp.i.(f) can emulate any game G that has the following
properties:
• There are two players.
• There is no element of chance
• Moves are essentially made by selecting them and announcing them.
• There is no hidden information: a player knows all the moves made so far
when making her current move, and there is nothing going on simultane-
ously either (Perfect Information).
1The fifty-move rule is a rule in chess stating that if no piece has been captured and no
pawn has been moved for fifty turns, the game is a draw. Under the fifty-move rule, a game
of chess can last a maximum of 6350 moves.
2 If w does not correspond to a legal chess game, we count it as a win for White if the first
illegal move is made by Black, and vice versa.
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• If one player loses (a certain amount) the other player wins (that same
amount) (Zero-Sum).
• The game can last no more than a certain number of rounds (Finite Du-
ration).
• There is a maximum number of alternatives each player can select from
(Finite Choice-of-Moves).
Any results for the games Γp.i.(f) apply to all the games with these properties.
David Blackwell described the concept of a strategy as [4]:
Imagine that you are to play the White pieces in a single game of
chess, and that you discover you are unable to be present for the
occasion. There is available a deputy, who will represent you on the
occasion, and who will carry out your instructions exactly, but who
is absolutely unable to make any decisions of his own volition. Thus,
in order to guarantee that your deputy will be able to conduct the
White pieces throughout the game, your instructions to him must
envisage every possible circumstance in which he may be required to
move, and must specify, for each such circumstance, what his choice
is to be. Any such complete set of instructions constitutes what we
shall call a strategy.
Thus, a strategy for a given player in a given game consists of a specification, for
each position in which he or she is required to make a move, of the particular
move to make in that position. In turn, a position can be specified by the
moves made to get to that position. If we apply this to the game Γp.i.(f), a
strategy becomes a function from the set of sequences of length < n of pairs
(xi, yi) ∈ X × Y , to the set of possible selections X , Y respectively.
Given strategies for each of the players, the outcome of the game is deter-
mined: each move follows from the current position and the strategy of the
player whose turn it is to move, and determines the next position. So, the to-
tality of all the decisions to be made can be described by a single decision -
the choice of a strategy. This is the normal form of a game: the two players
independently make a single move, which consists of selecting a strategy, and
then payoff is calculated and made.
Of course, there are good strategies and bad strategies. The value of a
strategy for a given player is the result of that strategy against the best coun-
terstrategy. The value of a game for a given player is the best result that that
player can guarantee, i.e. the value of that player’s best strategy. A game is
called determined if its value is the same for both players. That value is the
result that will occur if both players are playing perfectly.3
3In more general cases, we allow ǫ-approximation, i.e. a game is determined iff there exists
a value v such that for any ǫ > 0, the two players have strategies guaranteeing them a payoff
of at least v − ǫ or at most v + ǫ, respectively.
4 Introduction
Victor Allis [1] recently demonstrated that in a game of Connect-Four, the
first player can win, i.e. has a strategy that wins against any counterstrategy.
And countless persons throughout the ages have independently discovered that
in the game of Noughts-and-Crosses, both players can force a draw. These are
both examples of determinacy. It can be shown (using induction) that any game
Γ(f) as defined above is determined, and hence any game with all of the prop-
erties mentioned above is determined. In the case of Go, Chess, and Checkers,
this means that either one of the players has a winning strategy, or both players
have a drawing strategy.
Now consider the game of Scissors-Paper-Stone. In this game, the two play-
ers simultaneously ‘throw’ one of three symbols: ‘Stone’ (hand balled in a fist),
‘Paper’ (hand flat with the palm down) or ‘Scissors’ (middle and forefinger
spread, pointing forwards). If both players throw the same symbols, the result
is a draw; otherwise, Paper beats Stone, Stone beats Scissors, and Scissors beats
Paper (the reason being that “Paper wraps Stone, Stone blunts Scissors, and
Scissors cut Paper”). In this game, the players do not make moves in turn, but
simultaneously. In other words, both players make moves, and neither player
knows what move the other is making. This is an example of a game of Imperfect
Information.
The strategy ‘Throw Stone’ is a losing strategy, because it loses against
the counterstrategy ‘throw Paper’. The same can be said for any strategy of
the type ‘throw this’, for both players. So in terms of the concept of strategy
described above, this game is not determined. On the other hand, consider the
‘strategy’ ‘throw Scissors 1/3 of the time, throw Paper 1/3 of the time, and
throw Stone the remaining 1/3 of the time’. Against any other strategy, this
strategy loses, draws and wins 1/3 of the time each, for an ‘average result’ of a
draw. This strategy does not fit in the concept of strategy given above, but it
is clearly worth considering.
Strategies of this new type are called mixed strategies, as opposed to the old
type of strategies, the pure strategies. A mixed strategy for a given player in
a given game consists of a specification, for each position in which he or she is
required to make a move, of the probability distribution to be used to determine
what move to make in that position.4 Given mixed strategies for each of the
players, the outcome of the game is not determined, but we can calculate the
probability of each outcome. If we assign values to winning and losing (‘the loser
pays the winner one dollar’), then we can calculate the average profit/loss one
player can expect to make from the other, playing those strategies.
The value of a mixed strategy is therefore the expected average result against
the best counterstrategy. And a game is called determined if, for some value
v, one of the players has a strategy with which she can always expect to make
(on average) at least v, no matter what the other plays, while the other player
has a strategy with which he can always expect to lose (on average) at most v,
4 Standard game theory defines a mixed strategy as a probability distribution on pure
strategies, but the above definition can be shown to be equivalent to that one.
Blackwell Games 5
no matter what the other plays. As before, it can be shown (using induction
and a theorem of Von Neumann) that all finite two-person zero-sum games with
Imperfect Information (i.e. the games with the properties mentioned above,
except that players make moves at the same time instead of one after the other)
are determined.
All the games mentioned so far are of finite duration. Let, as before, X and
Y be two finite sets, and let f be a function assigning to each countably infinite
sequence w of pairs (xi, yi) ∈ X × Y , a payoff f(w) ∈ IR.5 We first consider
games of infinite duration and perfect information:
Two players are playing against each other. Each player, in turn,
makes a move by selecting an element x1 ∈ X or y1 ∈ Y , respectively,
and announcing his or her selection. Then they each in turn make
a second move, and a third move, and continue making moves for
a countably infinite number of rounds. This generates an infinite
sequence w of pairs (xi, yi) ∈ X × Y . ‘Then’ they stop, and player
II pays player I the amount f(w).
The problem with infinite games, of course, is that the outcome is only known
after an infinite number of moves, and thus it is impractical to play the game as
it is. But our concept of a strategy as a specification of which move to make in
each position, is still valid in the case of games of infinite duration. And given
strategies for both players we can construct the infinite sequence of moves that
will be played (or the probability distribution thereof), and apply the payoff
function to obtain our (expectation of the) outcome. Hence we can still play
the game in a fashion, by using its normal form.
The concepts of values and determinateness carry over as well. But it is no
longer provable that all such games are determined. For some payoff functions
f , such as bounded Borel-measurable functions f , it has been proven that the
infinite game of perfect information Γp.i.(f) is determined. But using the Axiom
of Choice, a nonmeasurable payoff function f can be constructed such that Γ(f)
is not determined [10]. The axiom AD, the axiom that all games Γ(f) are
determined, is widely used as an alternative to AC [9, 11].
A game of infinite duration and imperfect information is similar, except that
both players make their nth move at the same time. These games are called
Blackwell games, named after David Blackwell, the first one to describe and
study these games [2]. For Blackwell games, it has been proven that Γ(f) is
determined for the case that f is the indicator function of an open or Gδ set.
In this article I prove determinacy of Γ(f) for the case that f is the indicator
function of a Gδσ set. But the general case of Borel-measurable functions is still
open.
5 We tacitly assume f to be bounded, as otherwise things get ugly.
6 Definitions, Lemmas and Terminology
2 Definitions, Lemmas and Terminology
2.1 Games, Strategies and Values
The definitions in this subsection are fairly standard, and merely formalize the
intuitive concepts from the introduction. The lemmas are all basic properties
of game-values. For reasons of conciseness, no proofs are given in this section.
In order to define what a Blackwell game is, we first need some sets. Let X and
Y be two finite, nonempty sets, and put Z = X × Y . An (infinite) play is a
countably infinite sequence w of pairs (x, y) ∈ Z. We write W for the set of all
plays, i.e. W = ZIN
Definition 2.1 Let f :W → IR be a bounded Borel (measurable) function (i.e.
a bounded function such that f−1[O] is a Borel set for every open set O ⊆ IR).
The Blackwell game Γ(f) with payoff function f is the two-person zero-sum
infinite game of imperfect information played as follows: Player I selects an
element x1 ∈ X (makes the move x1) and, simultaneously, player II selects an
element y1 ∈ Y . Then both players are told z1 = (x1, y1), and the game is at
or has reached position (z1). Then player I selects x2 ∈ X and, simultaneously,
player II selects y2 ∈ Y . Then both players are told z2 = (x2, y2), and the game
is at position (z1, z2). Then both players simultaneously selects x3 ∈ X and
y3 ∈ Y , etc. Thus they produce a play w = (z1, z2, . . .). Then player II pays
player I the amount f(w), ending the game.
A position or finite play (of length k) is a finite sequence p (of length k) of pairs
(x, y) ∈ Z. We write P for the set of all positions, i.e. P = Z<ω.
Some notation and terminology that we are going to use:
w usually denotes an infinite play, p denotes a finite play or position.
p|n, w|n denote the sequences consisting of the first n moves made in p, w re-
spectively (counting a pair (x, y) as one move).
p̂p′, p̂w denote the sequences consisting of the finite sequence p followed by
the finite sequence p′ or the infinite sequence w, respectively.
len(p) denotes the length of a finite sequence p.
e denotes the position of length 0, i.e. the empty sequence.
Wn denotes the set of all finite plays of length n, i.e. Wn = Z
n, for n ∈ IN .
p ⊂ w denotes that w|len(p) = p, and we say that w hits or passes through p.
p ⊂ p′ denotes that p′|len(p) = p and p
′ 6= p, and we say that p′ follows p, and p
precedes p′.
p ⊆ p′ denotes that p′|len(p) = p, and we say that p
′ follows or is equal to p.
[p] denotes the set {w ∈W | w ⊃ p} of all plays hitting the position p.
[H ] denotes the set {w ∈ W | ∃p ∈ H : w ⊃ p} of all plays hitting any position
in a set of positions H .
We will sometimes write a sequence ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .) as (x1, y1, x2, y2, . . .).
Γ(S) denotes the game Γ(IS), where IS is the indicator function of S ⊆W .
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Remark 2.2 We give W the usual topology by letting the basic open sets
be the sets of the form [H ] for some some set H ⊆ Wn of positions of fixed
length n. Then the open subsets of W are exactly those of the form [H ] for
some set H of positions. The Gδ subsets of W are exactly those of the form
{w ∈ W | #{p ∈ H | w hits p} = ∞} for some set H of positions. Note that
under this topology, W is a compact space.
Definition 2.3 A strategy for player I in a Blackwell game Γ(f) is a function
σ assigning to each position p a probability distribution on X . More formally,
σ is a function P → [0, 1]X satisfying ∀p ∈ P :
∑
x∈X σ(p)(x) = 1.
Analogously, a strategy for player II is a function τ assigning to each position
p a probability distribution on Y .
Definition 2.4 Let σ and τ be strategies for players I, II in a Blackwell game
Γ(f). σ and τ determine a probability measure µσ,τ on W , induced by
µσ,τ [p] = P{w | w hits p} =
n∏
i=1
(
σ(p|(i−1))(xi) • τ(p|(i−1))(yi)
)
(2.1)
for any position p = (x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) ∈ P .
The expected income of player I in Γ(f), if she plays according to σ and
player II plays according to τ , is the expectation of f(w) under this probability
measure:
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) =
∫
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) (2.2)
Definition 2.5 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game. The value of a strategy σ for
player I in Γ(f) is the expected income player I can guarantee if she plays
according to σ. Similarly, the value of a strategy τ for player II in Γ(f) is the
amount to which player II can restrict player I’s income if he plays according to
τ . I.e.
val(σ in Γ(f)) = inf
τ
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (2.3)
val(τ in Γ(f)) = sup
σ
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (2.4)
Definition 2.6 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game. The lower value of Γ(f) is the
smallest upper bound on the income that player I can guarantee. Similarly, the
upper value of Γ(f) is the largest lower bound on the restrictions player II can
put on player I’s income. I.e.
val↓(Γ(f)) = sup
σ
val(σ in Γ(f)) = sup
σ
inf
τ
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (2.5)
val↑(Γ(f)) = inf
τ
val(τ in Γ(f)) = inf
τ
sup
σ
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (2.6)
Clearly, for all games Γ(f), val↓(Γ(f)) ≤ val↑(Γ(f)). If val↑(Γ(f)) = val↓(Γ(f)),
then Γ(f) is called determined, and we write val(Γ(f)) = val↑(Γ(f)) = val↓(Γ(f)).
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Definition 2.7 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game, and let ǫ > 0. A strategy σ
for player I in Γ(f) is optimal if val(σ in Γ(f)) = val↓(Γ(f)). A strategy σ for
player I in Γ(f) is ǫ-optimal if val(σ in Γ(f)) > val↓(Γ(f)) − ǫ. Similarly, a
strategy τ for player II in Γ(f) is optimal if val(τ in Γ(f)) = val↑(Γ(f)), and
ǫ-optimal if val(τ in Γ(f)) < val↑(Γ(f)) + ǫ.
Some basic properties of these values are:
Lemma 2.8 Let f , g be two payoff functions such that for all w ∈ W , f(w) ≤
g(w). Then val↓(Γ(f)) ≤ val↓(Γ(g)) and val↑(Γ(f)) ≤ val↑(Γ(g)).
Lemma 2.9 Let f be a payoff function, and let a, c ∈ IR, a ≥ 0.Then
val↓(Γ(af + c)) = a val↓(Γ(f)) + c and val↑(Γ(af + c)) = a val↑(Γ(f)) + c.
Lemma 2.10 Let f be a payoff function, and let fsw : (Y × X)IN → IR be
defined by
fsw((y1, x1), (y2, x2), . . .) = f((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .) (2.7)
Then
val↓(Γ(−f)) = −val↑(Γsw(fsw)) (2.8)
val↑(Γ(−f)) = −val↓(Γsw(fsw)) (2.9)
where Γsw(fsw) is the Blackwell game with payoff function fsw in which player
I selects moves from Y and player II selects moves from X.
Lemma 2.11 Let (fi)i be a sequence of functions fi :W → [a, b] such that (fi)i
converges pointwise to a function f : W → [a, b]. Then for any two strategies
σ, τ , limi→∞E(σ vs τ in Γ(fi)) = E(σ vs τ in Γ(f))
2.2 Starting and Stopping
Definition 2.12 Let f : W → IR be a bounded Borel function, and p =
((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn)) a position. The subgame Γ(f, p) starting from
position p is the game played like Γ(f), except that the players start at round
n+1, and the first n moves are supposed to have been x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xn, yn.
The game Γ(f, p) is played exactly the same as the game Γ(g), where g is the
payoff function defined by g(w) = f(p̂w).
As before, strategies σ and τ determine a probability measure µσ,τ in Γ(f,p)
on W . This measure is equal to the conditional probability measure obtained
from µσ,τ given [p], i.e.
µσ,τ in Γ(f,p)(S) =
µσ,τ (S ∩ [p])
µσ,τ [p]
if µσ,τ [p] = 0 (2.10)
The expected income of player I, the value of a strategy σ, etc. are defined for
the games Γ(f, p) in the same manner as for the games Γ(f).
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Definition 2.13 A stopping position in a Blackwell game Γ(f) is a position p,
such that for all plays w,w′ ∈ [p], f(w) = f(w′). We will denote this value by
f(p). A stopset in a Blackwell game Γ(f) is a set H of stopping positions, such
that no stopping position p ∈ H precedes another stopping position p′ ∈ H .
We will often define a payoff function f using the following format:
f(p) = formula1 for p ∈ H
f(w) = formula2 if w 6∈ [H ]
where H is a set of positions such that no position p ∈ H precedes another
position p′ ∈ H . Then H is a stopset in the game ΓH(f).
Remark 2.14 If p is a stopping position, any moves made at or after p will
not affect the outcome of the game. It is often convenient to assume that both
players will stop playing if a stopping position is reached. If Γ(f) is a Blackwell
game, and H is a stopset, we write ΓH(f) to explicitly denote that players stop
playing at the positions in H . In this case, we only require strategies to be
defined on nonstopping positions. Similarly, with respect to a subgame Γ(f, p),
we only require strategies to be defined on positions that are following or equal
to p. In fact it is occasionally necessary to assume that a strategy is not defined
on positions outside the subgame proper, for instance to combine strategies for
different subgames into one big strategy.
Using stopsets, a finite game can be treated as a special type of infinite game.
For finite games, we have determinacy, as well as a kind of continuity of the
value function.
Definition 2.15 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game. If, for some n, all positions in
Wn are stopping positions, then Γ(f) is called finite (of length n). If Γ(f) is
finite, we can stop after playing n rounds, and we will denote this by writing
Γn(f).
Theorem 2.16 (Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem[12]) Let Γ1(f) be a
finite one-round Blackwell game (i.e. of length 1). Then Γ1(f) is determined,
and both players have optimal strategies.
Theorem 2.17 Let Γn(f) be a finite Blackwell game of length n. Then Γn(f)
is determined, and both players have optimal strategies.
Lemma 2.18 Let n ∈ IN . Let (fi)i be a sequence of payoff functions fi :
Wn → [a, b] such that (fi)i converges to a payoff function f :Wn → [a, b]. Then
val(Γn(f)) = limi→∞ val(Γn(fi)).
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2.3 Equivalent Truncated Subgames
In games like Chess, Go, or even Risk or Monopoly, a player is usually allowed
to give up if he has no hope of winning. He doesn’t have to play it out in
the hope that the other player will make a mistake. Two players can agree
beforehand to stop in certain positions, and pay out the value of the game at
that position rather than continue playing. Provided their assessment of that
value is accurate, this does not change the value of the total game. We will call
a game resulting from such an alteration a truncated subgame.
Definition 2.19 Let f , g be two payoff functions, and H a stopset in Γ(g).
ΓH(g) is an equivalent truncated subgame of Γ(f) (truncated at H), if for any
play w 6∈ [H ], f(w) = g(w), and for any p ∈ H , g(p) = val(Γ(f, p)). ΓH(g) is
a truncated subgame, equivalent for player I [player II], if for any play w 6∈ H ,
f(w) = g(w), and for any p ∈ H , g(p) = val↓(Γ(f, p)) [g(p) = val↑(Γ(f, p))]. In
all three cases, Γ(f) is called an extension of ΓH(g).
Note that ΓH(g) is an equivalent truncated subgame of Γ(f) iff it is a truncated
subgame equivalent for both player I and player II.
Lemma 2.20 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game, and let ΓH(g) be a truncated sub-
game of Γ(f), truncated at a set of positions H, equivalent for player I [for
player II]. Then val↓(Γ(f)) = val↓(ΓH(g)) [val
↑(Γ(f)) = val↑(ΓH(g))]. Further-
more, for any ǫ > 0, any ǫ-optimal strategy for player I [player II] in ΓH(g) (if
it is undefined on all positions at or after positions in H) can be extended to an
ǫ-optimal strategy for player I [player II] in Γ(f).
Sketch of proof: We find an ǫ-optimal strategy for the truncated subgame
ΓH(g), and for the appropriate δ, δ-optimal strategies for the games Γ(f, p)
starting at positions p ∈ H , i.e. the positions where ΓH(g) stops. Then we
tie them together, and calculate how well the combination strategy performs
against opposing strategies.
Corollary 2.21 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game, and let ΓH(g) be an equivalent
truncated subgame of Γ(f) (truncated at H). If ΓH(g) is determined, then Γ(f)
is determined, and val(Γ(f)) = val(ΓH(g)). Furthermore, for any ǫ > 0, any
ǫ-optimal strategy for player I or player II in ΓH(g) can be extended to an ǫ-
optimal strategy for player I or player II in Γ(f).
Corollary 2.22 Let Γ(f),ΓH(g) be Blackwell games. If for any p ∈ H, g(p) ≤
val↓(Γ(f, p)), and for any w 6∈ [H ], g(w) ≤ f(w), then val↓(ΓH(g)) ≤ val
↓(Γ(f)).
Similarly for the value and the upper value, and for ≥ instead of ≤.
Truncated subgames may be nested. If we have a nested series of truncated
subgames, then we may extend a strategy for the smallest subgame to a strategy
for all subgames. This allows us to approximate complicated games with a series
of simpler, truncated subgames, obtain a strategy that is (ǫ-)optimal in all the
subgames. The final lemma in this section allows us to prove results for that
strategy in the original game.
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Definition 2.23 Let, for n ∈ IN , fn be a payoff function, and Hn a set of
stopping positions in Γ(fn). If for all n ∈ IN , ΓHn(fn) is a truncated subgame
of ΓHn+1(fn+1), and equivalent to ΓHn+1(fn+1) [for player I, II], then the series
of games (ΓHn(fn))n∈IN is called a nested series of equivalent truncated subgames
[equivalent for player I, II].
Lemma 2.24 Let (ΓHi(gi))i∈IN be a nested series of truncated games equivalent
for player I [player II]. Then all the games have the same lower value [upper
value]. Furthermore, we can find a strategy for player I [player II] that is ǫ-
optimal in all the games ΓHi(gi).
Sketch of proof: Basically, we apply Lemma 2.20 a number of times and
use induction. The proof is straightforward, except for a slight complication
involving the domain on which the strategies are defined. This complication is
solved using the observations that if we truncate a game, any stopping position
remains a stopping position, and that strategies can be assumed to be undefined
on stopping positions.
Corollary 2.25 Let (ΓHi(gi))i∈IN be a nested series of equivalent truncated
subgames. If ΓH0(g0) is determined, then all the games are determined, and all
the games have the same value. Furthermore, we can find strategies for player
I and player II that are ǫ-optimal in all the games ΓHi(gi).
Remark 2.26 If the component games involved all have optimal strategies,
then we can extend optimal strategies with optimal strategies to optimal strate-
gies, i.e. drop the ǫ in the above lemmas and corollaries.
3 Determinateness Results
3.1 Generalized Open Games
In this subsection we prove determinacy of a class of ‘generalized open games’,
where payoff for a play is calculated as the supremum of values associated with
the positions hit in the play. In addition we derive a result for these and open
games comparable to the compactness of W .
Theorem 3.1 Let u : P → IR be a bounded function, and let f : W → IR be
the payoff function defined by f(w) = supj∈IN u(w|j). Then Γ(f) is determined,
and
val(Γ(f)) = lim
n→∞
val(Γn(fn)) (3.11)
where fn(w) = supj≤n u(w|j).
Sketch of proof: Showing that limn→∞ val(Γn(fn)) exists and is not greater
than the lower value of Γ(f) is not difficult. To show that it is not less than
12 Definitions, Lemmas and Terminology
the upper value, we approximate Γ(f) with a collection of finite auxiliary games
Γn(gn) such that the payoff at the stopping positions is an estimate of the
value of the game at that point. We then show that these auxiliary games
form a nested series of equivalent finite truncated subgames. This allows us
to find a strategy that is optimal in each of the truncated subgames. This
strategy is also a strategy in the game Γ(f), and has a value in Γ(f) equal to
limn→∞ val(Γn(fn)).
Proof: Without loss of generality we may assume that the function u has range
[0, 1]. For any p ∈ P , and any n ∈ IN , the game Γn(fn, p) is finite (of length
≤ n), and thus determined. It is easily seen that f0 ≤ f1 ≤ f2 ≤ . . . ≤ f ≤ 1.
Consequently, for any p ∈ P ,
val(Γ0(f0, p)) ≤ val(Γ1(f1, p)) ≤ val(Γ2(f2, p)) ≤ . . . ≤ val
↓(Γ(f, p)) ≤ 1
(3.12)
For all p ∈ P , limk→∞ val(Γk(fk, p)) exists, since all monotone non-decreasing
bounded sequences converge. Furthermore, for all p ∈ P ,
lim
n→∞
val(Γn(fn, p)) ≤ val
↓(Γ(f, p)) (3.13)
Define for any n ∈ IN the payoff function gn : Wn → [0, 1] by
gn(p) = lim
k→∞
val(Γk(fk, p)) for p ∈Wn (3.14)
Then for all p ∈Wn, gn(p) ≥ val(Γn(fn, p)) = fn(p).
Furthermore, the games Γn(gn) form a nested series of equivalent truncated
subgames. For fix n ∈ IN , p ∈ Wn. Define for k ∈ IN , hn+1,k : Wn+1 → IR by
hn+1,k(p
′) = val(Γk(fk, p
′)) for p′ ∈Wn+1. Then
gn(p) = lim
k→∞
val(Γk(fk, p)) (3.15)
= lim
k→∞
val(Γn+1(hn+1,k, p)) (3.16)
= val(Γn+1( lim
k→∞
hn+1,k, p)) (3.17)
= val(Γn+1(gn+1, p)) (3.18)
(equation (3.16) follows from Corollary 2.21, and equation (3.17) follows from
Lemma 2.18 as Wn+1 is finite).
Since (Γn(gn))n∈IN is a nested series of equivalent truncated subgames, by
Corollary 2.25 the games Γn(gn) all have the same value, say v. Also, we can
find a strategy for player II that is ǫ-optimal in all the games Γn(gn), and since
all the games Γn(gn) are finite and hence have optimal strategies, by Remark
2.26 we can even find a strategy that is optimal in all the games Γn(gn). So let
τ be such a strategy. Then for any strategy σ, and any n ∈ IN ,
E(σ vs τ in Γn(gn)) ≤ val(Γn(gn)) = v (3.19)
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Now let σ be any strategy for player I in Γ(f). Then
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f))
= lim
n→∞
E(σ vs τ in Γn(fn)) (3.20)
≤ lim
n→∞
E(σ vs τ in Γn(gn)) (3.21)
≤ v (3.22)
So
val↑(Γ(f)) ≤ val(τ for player II in Γ(f)) ≤ v (3.23)
But also
v = val(Γ0(g0)) = go(e) = lim
k→∞
val(Γk(fk)) ≤ val
↓(Γ(f)) (3.24)
Therefore,
val↑(Γ(f)) = val↓(Γ(f)) = lim
k→∞
val(Γk(fk)) (3.25)
✷
Corollary 3.2 Let O be an open set. Then Γ(O) is determined.
Proof: There exists a set of positions H such that O = [H ]. Then for all
w ∈ W , IO(w) = supn∈IN IH(w|n). Applying Theorem 3.1 yields the corollary.
✷
Corollary 3.3 Let O =
⋃
iOi be the union of open sets. Then val(Γ(O)) =
limn→∞ val(Γ(
⋃
i≤nOi)).
Proof: As the union of open sets, O is open, and hence there is a set of positions
H such that O = [H ], i.e.
O = {w ∈ W | ∃p ∈ H : p ⊂ w} (3.26)
Define the basic open sets Bj ⊆ O by
Bn = {w ∈W | ∃p ∈ H : p ⊂ w ∧ len(p) ≤ n} (3.27)
then for all w ∈W ,
IO(w) = sup
j∈IN
IH(w|j) (3.28)
IBn(w) = sup
j≤n
IH(w|j) (3.29)
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so applying Theorem 3.1, we find that
val(Γ(O)) = lim
n→∞
val(Γn(Bn)) (3.30)
For eachm ∈ IN , Bm is a closed set covered by the open sets (Oi)i∈IN . So by the
compactness ofW there is for each m ∈ IN a nm ∈ IN such that Bm ⊆
⋃nm
i=1Oi.
Then for all n ≥ nm,
val(Γm(Bm)) ≤ val(Γ(
n⋃
i=1
Oi)) ≤ val(Γ(O)) (3.31)
The corollary follows immediately.
✷
Corollary 3.4 Let f be a continuous function. Then Γ(f) is determined.
Proof: As W is compact, and f is continuous, f [W ] is compact, and hence
bounded. Define u : P → IR by u(p) := infw∈[p] f(w). Then u is well-defined
and bounded, and by the continuity of f , f(w) = supn∈IN u(w|n) for all w ∈W .
Applying Theorem 3.1 yields the corollary.
✷
Remark 3.5 In the case of open games (or generalized open games, described
later) there is an optimal strategy for player II. This strategy can be described
as ‘at every position player II plays the optimal one-round strategy, looking at
the values the game has for player I from all positions directly following that
one’. However, for player I there does not always exist an optimal strategy, as
the following example shows.
Example 3.6 Consider the following Blackwell game. Each round, both play-
ers say either ‘Stop’ or ‘Continue’. If both players say ‘Continue’, then play
continues. Otherwise, the game halts: player II wins (payoff 0) if both players
said ‘Stop’, while player I wins (payoff 1) if only one of the players said ‘Stop’.
If play continues indefinitely, and neither player ever says ‘Stop’, then payoff is
0, i.e. player II wins.
This is clearly an open game. An interpretation of this game is, that player
II tries to guess on which round player I will say ‘Stop’, and tries to match her.
If player II guesses wrong, i.e. says ‘Stop’ too soon or not soon enough, then
player I wins, if player II guesses right, then he wins.
A strategy of value 1 − 1
n
for player I is, to select at random a number i
between 1 and n, and say ‘Stop’ on round i. Translated to the standard format
for strategies, this becomes:
on round 1, say ‘Stop’ 1
n
of the time,
on round 2, if not yet stopped, say ‘Stop’ 1
n−1 of the time,
Blackwell Games 15
on round 3, if not yet stopped, say ‘Stop’ 1
n−2 of the time,
...
on round n, if not yet stopped, say ‘Stop’ 11 of the time.
Hence, the value of this game is 1. In fact, the value of this game at any
position in which game has not yet ended is 1. But there exists no optimal
strategy of value 1. For suppose there exists such a strategy, of value 1. Then
on any round (in which play has not yet ended), the chance that player I will
say ‘Stop’ in that round is 0%. For otherwise, the strategy would not score
100% against the counterstrategy that player II says ‘Stop’ on that round. But
then, player I will never say ‘Stop’, and this strategy will lose against the coun-
terstrategy that player II never says ‘Stop’. So any strategy for player I has
value strictly less than 1, although there are strategies with values arbitrarily
close to 1. This game is an example of a game in which one of the players has
no optimal strategy.
3.2 Gδ-sets
Davis’ proof of determinacy for Gδσ games of perfect information [5] is based
upon the idea of ‘imposing restrictions’ on the range of moves player II can
make. I.e. certain moves are declared ‘forbidden’, or a loss for player II, in such
a way that (a) if player I did not have a win before, she does not get a win now,
and (b) a particular Gδ set is now certain to be avoided. By applying this to
all the Gδ subsets of a Gδσ set, and using compactness, he shows that if player
I cannot force the resulting sequence to be in one of the Gδ sets, player II can
force the resulting sequence to be outside all of them.
The union of all the sequences in which one of the ‘forbidden’ moves is played,
is an open set that contains the Gδ set in question. One way of looking at Davis’
proof is, that he enlarges each of the Gδ sets to an open set without increasing
the (lower) value of the game, in order to be able to apply determinacy of open
games.
In this subsection, we show that this holds (in a fashion) for Blackwell games,
i.e. that a Gδ set can be ‘enlarged’ to an open set without increasing the lower
value of the game by more than an arbitrarily small amount, even in the presence
of a ‘background function’, a payoff function for those sequences that are not in
the Gδ set.
Theorem 3.7 Let f : W → [0, 1] be a measurable function and let D be a Gδ
set. Then
val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) = inf
O⊇D,O open
val↓(Γ(max(f, IO))) (3.32)
Sketch of proof: We define a collection of auxiliary games ΓHi(gi) of the
game Γ(max(f, ID)), in which the amount player I gets at a stopping po-
sition p is an estimate for the value of Γ(max(f, ID)) at position p, namely
infO⊇D,O open val(Γ(max(f, IO), p)). We then show that these auxiliary games
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form a nested series of finite truncated subgames, equivalent for player I. This
allows us to find a strategy that is ǫ-optimal in each of the truncated subgames.
This strategy is also a strategy in the game Γ(max(f, ID)), and has the required
value, proving one side of the equation. The other side is trivial.
Proof: Put v = infO⊇D,O open val
↓(Γ(max(f, IO))). For any Gδ set D we can
find a set of positions H , such that D = {w ∈ W | #{p ∈ H | p ⊂ w} = ∞}.
We may assume that e ∈ H .
Define for any i ∈ IN ,
Hi := {p ∈ H | there are exactly i positions p
′ in H strictly preceding p}
(3.33)
Define for any i ∈ IN the payoff functions gi, hi by
gi(p) = inf
O⊇D,O open
val↓(Γ(max(f, IO), p)) for p ∈ Hi (3.34)
gi(w) = f(w) if w 6∈ [Hi] (3.35)
hi(p) = 1 for p ∈ Hi (3.36)
hi(w) = f(w) if w 6∈ [Hi] (3.37)
First, the games ΓHi(gi) form a nested series of truncated subgames equivalent
for player I. For let i ∈ IN , and fix p ∈ Hi. Let O ⊇ D, then for any p′ ∈ Hi+1
such that p′ ⊇ p, val↓(Γ(max(f, IO), p′)) ≥ gi+1(p′), and for any w ⊃ p such
that w 6∈ [Hi+1], max(f, IO)(w) ≥ f(w) = gi+1(w). Hence by Corollary 2.22,
for any O ⊇ D, val↓(Γ(max(f, IO), p)) ≥ val
↓(ΓHi+1(gi+1, p)). Therefore,
gi(p) ≥ val
↓(ΓHi+1(gi+1, p)) (3.38)
On the other hand, for any ǫ > 0 we can find, for each p′ ∈ Hi+1, an open set
Op′ ⊇ D such that
val↓(Γ(max(f, IOp′ ), p
′)) ≤ gi+1(p
′) + ǫ (3.39)
Set O =
⋃
p′∈Hi+1
([p′] ∩Op′). Then for all p′ ∈ Hi+1, val
↓(Γ(max(f, IO), p
′)) =
val↓(Γ(max(f, IOp′ ), p
′)) ≤ gi+1(p′)+ǫ, and for anyw 6∈ [Hi+1], max(f, IO)(w) =
f(w) = gi+1(w). Hence by Corollary 2.22,
gi(p) ≤ val
↓(Γ(max(f, IO), p)) ≤ val
↓(ΓHi+1(gi+1, p)) + ǫ (3.40)
This holds for any ǫ > 0, therefore
gi(p) = val
↓(ΓHi+1(gi+1, p)) (3.41)
Finally, for any i ∈ IN , and any play w 6∈ [Hi], we have that w 6∈ [Hi+1],
and hence gi(w) = f(w) = gi+1(w). So ΓHi(gi) is a truncated subgame of
ΓHi+1(gi+1) equivalent for player I.
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Let ǫ > 0. Since (ΓHi(gi))i∈IN is a nested series of truncated subgames equiv-
alent for player I, by Lemma 2.24 all the games have the same lower value,
namely val↓(ΓH0(g0)) = g0(e) = v, and there exists a strategy σ for player I
that is ǫ-optimal in all the games ΓHi(gi), i.e. for any strategy τ , and any i ∈ IN ,
E(σ vs τ in ΓHi(gi)) ≥ val
↓(ΓHi(gi))− ǫ = v − ǫ (3.42)
Now let τ be any strategy for player II in Γ(max(f, ID)). Then
E(σ vs τ in Γ(max(f, ID)))
= lim
i→∞
E(σ vs τ in ΓHi(hi)) (3.43)
≥ lim
i→∞
E(σ vs τ in ΓHi(gi)) (3.44)
≥ v − ǫ (3.45)
So σ is a strategy for player I of value at least v − ǫ. This implies that
val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) ≥ v − ǫ. This construction can be done for any ǫ > 0,
hence
val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) ≥ v (3.46)
For any O ⊇ D, val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) ≤ val
↓(Γ(max(f, IO))), hence
val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) ≤ inf
O⊇D,O open
val↓(Γ(max(f, IO))) = v (3.47)
Hence val↓(Γ(max(f, ID))) = v.
✷
Corollary 3.8 Let S be a measurable set, and let D be a Gδ set. Suppose that
Γ(S ∪ D) has lower value v. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exist an open set O,
D ⊆ O, such that Γ(S ∪O) has lower value at most v + ǫ.
Proof: Take f ≡ IS and apply the non-trivial part of Theorem 3.7.
✷
Corollary 3.9 Let D be a Gδ set. Then Γ(D) is determined, and
val(Γ(D)) = inf
O⊇D,O open
val(Γ(O)) (3.48)
Proof: For any open set O ⊇ D, Γ(O) is determined and val↓(Γ(D)) ≤
val↑(Γ(D)) ≤ val(Γ(O)). Applying Theorem 3.7 with f ≡ 0 yields the Corollary.
✷
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3.3 Gδσ-sets
In this subsection, we prove the determinacy of Γ(f) in the case that f is
the indicator function of a Gδσ set. Structurally, this proof is similar to the
aforementioned proof by Davis for Gδσ games of perfect information [5]. We
apply the results of the previous subsection to the Gδ subsets of a Gδσ set.
Corollary 3.3 takes the place of the compactness used in Davis’ proof.
Theorem 3.10 Let S =
⋃
iDi be a Gδσ set. Then Γ(S) is determined.
Sketch of proof: Each of the Gδ sets composing the Gδσ set is enlarged to
an open set using Corollary 3.8, in such a way that at all times the lower value
is not increased by more than ǫ (compared to the original game), where ǫ is
arbitrarily small. The resulting union of open sets is itself open, and hence
determined, and furthermore Corollary 3.3 allows us to conclude that the total
increase of the lower value is still not more than ǫ. This means that the upper
value of the original game is also only at most ǫ more than the lower value.
Note that, unlike the previous proofs, this proof does not produce an optimal
or ǫ-optimal strategy.
Proof: Put v = val↓(Γ(S)). Let ǫ > 0. Using Corollary 3.8, we can find
inductively open sets Oi ⊇ Di such that for all j ∈ IN ,
val↓(Γ(S ∪
⋃
i≤j+1
Oi)) ≤ val
↓(Γ(S ∪
⋃
i≤j
Oi)) + ǫ/2
j (3.49)
Then for all j ∈ IN ,
val↓(Γ(S ∪
⋃
i≤j
Oi)) ≤ v + ǫ (3.50)
and hence, for all j ∈ IN ,
val(Γ(
⋃
i≤j
Oi)) ≤ v + ǫ (3.51)
Then by Corollary 3.3,
val(Γ(
⋃
i∈IN
Oi)) ≤ v + ǫ (3.52)
Since S =
⋃
i∈IN Di ⊆
⋃
i∈IN Oi,
val↑(Γ(S)) ≤ val↑(Γ(
⋃
i∈IN
Oi)) = val(Γ(
⋃
i∈IN
Oi)) ≤ v + ǫ (3.53)
This is true for any ǫ, hence val↑(Γ(S)) = v = val↓(Γ(S)).
✷
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Remark 3.11 The proof of Theorem 3.10 shows that anyGδσ set (and a fortiori
any set of lesser complexity) can be enlarged to an open set such that the value of
the Blackwell game on that set is not increased by more than an arbitrarily small
amount. A plausible conjecture is, that this holds for any Borel-measurable set.
This conjecture holds in the case of games of Perfect Information. Such a
game, on a Borel-set S, is determined and has value 0 or 1. If it has value 0 then
player II has a winning strategy. The set of plays that cannot occur if player II
uses that strategy, is an open set, and the game on that set has value 0 as well.
4 The Axiom of Determinacy for Blackwell Games
For Games of Perfect Information, there exists the Axiom of Determinacy, which
states that any Game of Perfect Information with finite choice of moves is de-
termined6. AD has many interesting consequences, such as the existence of an
ultrafilter on ℵ1, the existence of a complete measure on IR, the non-existence
of a sequence of ℵ1 reals, and the negation of the Axiom of Choice. We can
formulate an analogue of AD with respect to Blackwell Games, and look at the
consequences of that axiom. But AD is an axiom about games on all subsets of
W , not just on the Borel measurable subsets7 An analogous axiom for Black-
well Games should therefore not be limited to games with measurable payoff
functions. Hence we need to extend the concepts of expectation and value for
Blackwell games.
Definition 4.1 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell Game, where f is bounded but not
necessarily Borel measurable. Let σ and τ be strategies for players I, II. σ and
τ determine a probability measure µσ,τ on W , induced by setting
µσ,τ [p] = P{w | w hits p} =
n∏
i=1
(
σ(p|(i−1))(xi) • τ(p|(i−1))(yi)
)
(4.1)
for any position p = (x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn) ∈ P .
Instead of the expected income of player I, if she plays according to σ and
player II plays according to τ , we now have the lower and upper expected income
:
E−(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) = sup
g≤f,g measurable
∫
g(w)dµσ,τ (w) (4.2)
E+(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) = inf
g≥f,g measurable
∫
g(w)dµσ,τ (w) (4.3)
6 Formally, AD is an axiom about games with countable choice of moves, whose payoff
function is the indicator function of a set S ⊆ W . But in the case of Games of Perfect Infor-
mation, determinacy for games with countable choice of moves is equivalent to determinacy for
games with finite choice of moves, and determinacy for games with 0-1-valued payoff functions
is equivalent to determinacy for games with arbitrary bounded payoff functions.
7 AD with respect only to games on Borel measurable subsets (and finite sets X and Y ) is
in fact provable from CAC [6, 7].
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Lower value and upper value are redefined in the obvious way:
val↓(Γ(f)) = sup
σ
inf
τ
E−(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (4.4)
val↑(Γ(f)) = inf
τ
sup
σ
E+(σ vs τ in Γ(f)) (4.5)
Note that in the case that f is measurable, these definitions reduce to the old
definitions.
Definition 4.2 The Axiom of Determinacy for Blackwell Games (AD-Bl) is the
statement that for every pair of non-empty finite sets X,Y , and every bounded
function f on W = (X × Y )IN , the Blackwell Game Γ(f) is determined, i.e.
val↓(Γ(f)) = val↑(Γ(f)) (4.6)
Theorem 4.3 Assuming AD-Bl, it follows that all sets of reals are Lebesgue
measurable.
Sketch of proof: Let X and Y be the set {0, 1}. Then we can construct a
mapping φ :W → [0, 1] such that if either σ or τ is the strategy that assigns the
1
2 -
1
2 probability distribution to every position, then the measure µσ,τ induces
the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. We can then deduce the measurability of a set
S ⊆ [0, 1] from the determinacy of the game Γ(φ−1[S]).
Some of the consequences of Theorem 4.3 are, that AD-Bl is not consistent
with AC, and that the consistency of ZF + AD-Bl cannot be proven in ZFC.
These results are all similar to results for AD. An open problem is that of
the relationship between AD and AD-Bl, whether AD follows from AD-Bl, or
vice versa, or even whether AD-Bl follows from a stronger version of AD such
as ADIR. From a given game of Perfect Information, we can easily construct
a Blackwell game that is ‘equivalent’, and assuming AD-Bl we can find an ǫ-
optimal mixed strategy for that equivalent Blackwell-game. However, to derive
AD from AD-Bl, we need to have a pure strategy, and even though we can inter-
pret any mixed strategy as a probability distribution on pure strategies, there
is no guarantee that any of these pure strategies will do as well as the mixed
strategy against all counterstrategies.
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A Notational Conventions
• I, II: the two players
• X , Y : the two sets out of which I and II choose their moves
• Z: X × Y
• w,w′: plays
• W : the set of all plays
• Wn: the set of all finite plays of length n
• S: a subset of W
• B: a basic open subset of W
• O: an open subset of W
• D: a Gδ subset of W
• p, p′: finite plays or positions
• e: the starting position
• P : the set of all positions
• H,H ′: sets of positions, usually stopsets or stopsets-to-be
• w ⊃ p: the play w hits position p
• p′ ⊃ p: the position p′ follows p
• p′ ⊇ p: the position p′ follows or is equal to p
• [p]: the set of plays hitting position p
• [H ]: the set of plays hitting any position in H
• p̂p′, p̂w: the plays obtained by concatenating sequences p and p′ or w
• p|n, w|n: the plays consisting of the first n moves in p or w
• len(p): the length of a position p
• f, g, h: payoff functions
• f(w): the payoff player I gets from player II for the play w
• f(p): if p is a stopping position, the payoff player I gets from player II for
any play w that passes through p
• Γ(f): the game with payoff function f
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• ΓH(f): the game with payoff function f and stopset H
• Γn(f): the finite game with payoff function f and stopset Wn
• Γ(S): the game with payoff function IS
• Γ(f, p): the game with payoff function f , starting from position p
• σ: a strategy for player I
• τ : a strategy for player II
• E(σ vs τ in Γ(f)): the expected payoff when playing σ against τ in the
game Γ(f)
• val(σ in Γ(f)): the value of σ in the game Γ(f)
• val(Γ(f)): the value of the game Γ(f)
• val↓(Γ(f)): the lower value of the game Γ(f)
• val↑(Γ(f)): the upper value of the game Γ(f)
• u, v: values
B Proofs
B.1 Equivalent Truncated Subgames
Lemma 2.20 Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game, and let ΓH(g) be a truncated sub-
game of Γ(f), truncated at a set of positions H, equivalent for player I [for
player II]. Then val↓(Γ(f)) = val↓(ΓH(g)) [val
↑(Γ(f)) = val↑(ΓH(g))]. Further-
more, for any ǫ > 0, any ǫ-optimal strategy for player I [player II] in ΓH(g) (if
it is undefined on all positions at or after positions in H) can be extended to an
ǫ-optimal strategy for player I [player II] in Γ(f).
Proof: Let Γ(f) be a Blackwell game, and let ΓH(g) be a truncated subgame
of Γ(f), truncated at a set of positions H , equivalent for player I. This means
that for any p ∈ H , g(p) = val↓(Γ(f, p)), and for any w 6∈ [H ], g(w) = f(w).
Let ǫ > 0, and let σ0 be an ǫ-optimal strategy for player I in the game ΓH(g).
If v = val↓(ΓH(g)), and u = val(σ0 in ΓH(g)), then 0 ≤ v − u < ǫ. So choose
δ > 0 such that δ < ǫ − (v − u), and fix for each p ∈ H a δ-optimal strategy
σp for player I in Γ(f, p). By Remark 2.14 we may assume that for any p ∈ H ,
σp is defined exactly on p and those positions that are after p, and that σ0 is
defined exactly on those positions that are not at or after any position in H . It
follows that σ =
⋃
p∈H σp∪σ0 is a well-defined strategy for player I in the game
Γ(f).
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Now let τ be a strategy for player II in Γ(f). Then for each p ∈ H ,∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) =
(∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w)
µσ,τ [p]
)
µσ,τ [p] (B.1)
=
(∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ in Γ(f,p)(w)
)
µσ,τ [p] (B.2)
= E(σ vs τ in Γ(f, p))µσ,τ [p] (B.3)
= E(σp vs τ in Γ(f, p))µσ0,τ [p] (B.4)
≥
(
val↓(Γ(f, p))− δ
)
µσ0,τ [p] (B.5)
= (g(p)− δ)µσ0,τ [p] (B.6)
and consequently,
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f))
=
∫
w∈W
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) (B.7)
=
∑
p∈H
(∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w)
)
+
∫
w 6∈[H]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) (B.8)
≥
∑
p∈H
(g(p)− δ)µσ0,τ [p] +
∫
w 6∈[H]
g(w)dµσ0,τ (w) (B.9)
≥
∑
p∈H
g(p)µσ0,τ [p] +
∫
w 6∈[H]
g(w)dµσ0,τ (w)
 − δ (B.10)
=
∫
w
g(w)dµσ0,τ (w) − δ (B.11)
≥ u− δ (B.12)
> v − ǫ (B.13)
So σ is an extension of σ0 of value greater than v − ǫ. Since this can be done
for any ǫ > 0, and any ǫ-optimal strategy σ0, this implies that val
↓(Γ(f)) ≥ v.
Similarly, let ǫ > 0, and let σ be a strategy for player I in Γ(f). Then we can
find counterstrategies τ0, τp for p ∈ H for player II in ΓH(g), Γ(f, p) respectively,
such that E(σ vs τ0 in ΓH(g)) < val
↓(ΓH(g))+ǫ/2, and E(σ vs τp in Γ(f, p)) <
val↓(Γ(f, p)) + ǫ/2 for any p ∈ H . We can assume that for any p ∈ H , τp is
defined exactly on those positions that are at or after p, and that τ0 is defined
exactly on those positions that are not at or after any any position in H . It
follows that τ =
⋃
p∈H τp∪τ0 is a well-defined strategy for player II in the game
Γ(f). Then for each p ∈ H ,∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) =
(∫
w∈[p] f(w)dµσ,τ (w)
µσ,τ [p]
)
µσ,τ [p] (B.14)
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=
(∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ in Γ(f,p)(w)
)
µσ,τ [p] (B.15)
= E(σ vs τ in Γ(f, p))µσ,τ [p] (B.16)
= E(σ vs τp in Γ(f, p))µσ,τ0 [p] (B.17)
≤
(
val↓(Γ(f, p)) + ǫ/2
)
µσ,τ0[p] (B.18)
= (g(p) + ǫ/2)µσ,τ0[p] (B.19)
and consequently,
E(σ vs τ in Γ(f))
=
∫
w∈W
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) (B.20)
=
∑
p∈H
(∫
w∈[p]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w)
)
+
∫
w 6∈[H]
f(w)dµσ,τ (w) (B.21)
≤
∑
p∈H
(g(p) + ǫ/2)µσ,τ0[p] +
∫
w 6∈[H]
g(w)dµσ,τ0(w) (B.22)
≤
∑
p∈H
g(p)µσ,τ0 [p] +
∫
w 6∈[H]
g(w)dµσ,τ0(w) + ǫ/2 (B.23)
=
∫
w
g(p)dµσ,τ0(w) + ǫ/2 (B.24)
< v + ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 (B.25)
= v + ǫ (B.26)
Since this can be done for any strategy σ and any ǫ > 0, it follows that
val↓(Γ(f)) ≤ v. Hence
val↓(Γ(f)) = v = val↓(ΓH(g)) (B.27)
An ǫ-optimal strategy for player I in ΓH(g) can be extended to an ǫ-optimal
strategy for player I in Γ(f) as in the first part of the proof.
The proof for the upper value is analogous.
✷
Theorem 2.24 Let (ΓHi(gi))i∈IN be a nested series of truncated games equiv-
alent for player I [player II]. Then all the games have the same lower value
[upper value]. Furthermore, we can find a strategy for player I [player II] that
is ǫ-optimal in all the games ΓHi(gi).
Proof: For all i ∈ IN , ΓHi(gi) is a truncated subgame of ΓHi+1(gi+1), equivalent
for player I. By Lemma 2.20, this means that for all i ∈ IN , val↓(ΓHi(gi)) =
val↓(ΓHi+1(gi+1)). It follows that for all i ∈ IN ,
val↓(ΓHi(gi)) = val
↓(ΓH0 (g0)) (B.28)
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Now let ǫ > 0, and let σ0 be an ǫ-optimal strategy for player I in ΓH0(g0).
Assume that σ0 is only defined on non-stopping positions of ΓH0(g0). We can
inductively define ǫ-optimal strategies σi in the games ΓHi(gi) such that for all
i ∈ IN , σi+1 is an extension of σi. For suppose we have extended σ0 to an
ǫ-optimal strategy σi in ΓHi(gi), defined only on non-stopping positions. Then
σi is undefined on positions at or after positions in Hi, and thus by Lemma 2.20
we can extend σi to an ǫ-optimal strategy σ
′
i+1 in ΓHi+1(gi+1).
By Remark 2.14, we may restrict this strategy σ′i+1 to the non-stopping
positions in ΓHi+1(gi+1). This restriction σi+1 is an extension of σi as well.
For let p be a stopping position in ΓHi+1(gi+1). If p is preceded by a stopping
position in ΓHi(gi), then p is itself a stopping position in ΓHi(gi). Otherwise,
we observe that for any play w ⊃ p, gi+1(w) = gi+1(p), and for any position
q ⊇ p, Γ(gi+1, q) is determined with value gi+1(p). By the truncated-subgame
condition, this implies that any w ∈ [p] has payoff gi+1(p) in ΓHi(gi), and again
p is a stopping position.
Now, if p is a position, and σi(p), σj(p) are defined, i < j, then σi(p) =
σi+1(p) = . . . = σj(p). Therefore we can define σ by σ =
⋃
i∈IN σi, i.e.
σ(p) = σi(p) if σi is defined on p, for any i ∈ IN (B.29)
Then for any i ∈ IN , for any non-stopping position p of ΓHi(gi), σ(p) is defined
and σ(p) = σi(p). Hence, σ is ǫ-optimal in all the games. σ is defined on all the
non-stopping positions of all the games ΓHi(gi), but if necessary we can extend
σ to a strategy σ′ defined on all positions, by choosing a default probability
distribution for those positions on which σ is not defined.
✷
B.2 Finite Games
Lemma B.1 Let C be a closed convex set in IRn, and let b ∈ IRn − C. Then
there exists a hyperplane separating b and C, i.e. a vector y ∈ IRn − {0} and
d ∈ IR such that
yT b > d (B.30)
yT z < d for each z ∈ C (B.31)
Proof: Since the theorem is trivial if C = ∅, we assume C 6= ∅. As C is closed,
there exists a vector c in C that is nearest to b, i.e. that minimizes ‖z−b‖. And
because b 6∈ C, ‖c− b‖ > 0. We define
y = b− c (B.32)
d =
1
2
(yT b+ yT c) (B.33)
Then yT b − d = yT (b − 12 (b + c)) =
1
2 (b − c)
T (b − c) > 0, proving that (B.30)
holds.
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Now suppose that (B.31) does not hold. Then for some z ∈ C, yT z ≥ d.
Since, yT c − d = yT (c − 12 (b + c)) = −
1
2 (b − c)
T (b − c) < 0, this implies
yT (z − c) > 0. Hence there exists a λ with 0 < λ ≤ 1 and
λ <
2yT (z − c)
‖z − c‖2
(B.34)
As C is convex, c+ λ(z − c) belongs to C. Moreover,
‖(c+ λ(z − c))− b‖2 = ‖λ(z − c)− y‖2 (B.35)
= λ2‖z − c‖2 − 2λyT (z − c) + ‖y‖2 (B.36)
< ‖y‖2 = ‖c− b‖2 (B.37)
contradicting the fact that c is a point in C nearest to b. Therefore, for all
z ∈ C, yT z < d, and (B.31) holds.
✷
Theorem 2.16 (Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem[12]) Let Γ1(f) be a
finite one-round Blackwell game (i.e. of length 1). Then Γ1(f) is determined,
and both players have optimal strategies.
Proof: f is (or can be interpreted as) a function X × Y → IR. Without
loss of generality we may assume that X = {1, . . . , n}, Y = {1, . . . ,m}. A
strategy σ for player I in Γ1(f) is (or can be interpreted as) a nonnegative
vector (x1, . . . , xn) such that
∑n
i=1 xi = 1, and similarly, a strategy τ for player
II is (or can be interpreted as) a nonnegative vector (y1, . . . , ym) such that∑m
j=1 yj = 1. It is easily seen that
E(σ vs τ in Γ1(f)) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
xiyjf(i, j) (B.38)
val(σ in Γ1(f)) = min
1≤j≤m
n∑
i=1
xif(i, j) (B.39)
val(τ in Γ1(f)) = max
1≤i≤n
m∑
j=1
yjf(i, j) (B.40)
Let C ⊂ IRm be the convex hull of the vectors (f(i, 1), . . . , f(i,m)), i = 1, . . . , n.
Then each point z ∈ C corresponds to (at least) one strategy σ for player I, with
val(σ in Γ1(f)) being equal to the coordinate of z which has the least value. Let
C− = {z ∈ IRm | ∃z′ ∈ C : z ≤ z′}, using coordinatewise ordening of vectors.
Then player I has a strategy of value u ∈ IR iff the vector (u, . . . , u) ∈ C−. It is
obvious that C and C− are both closed convex sets.
Now let v = val↓(Γ1(f)), ǫ > 0. Then there exists no strategy σ for player
I of value v + ǫ, i.e. b = (v + ǫ, . . . , v + ǫ) 6∈ C−. By Lemma B.1 this implies
that there exist a vector y ∈ IRm − {0} and d ∈ IR, such that yT b > d while
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yT z < d for any z ∈ C−. For any j ≤ m, any z ∈ C−, and any r > 0,
yT z−yjr = yT (z1, . . . , zj−1, zj−r, zj+1, . . . , zm) < d, i.e. yj > (yT z−d)/r. Since
r > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that for any j ≤ m, yj ≥ 0. Since y 6= 0, we may
also assume, without loss of generality, that
∑m
j=1 yj = 1. Then for any z ∈ C
−,
yT z < d < yT b = v + ǫ. In particular, for i = 1, . . . , n,
∑m
j=1 yjf(i, j) < v + ǫ.
Thus, y corresponds to a strategy τ of value lower than v + ǫ. Since we can do
this construction for any ǫ > 0, it follows that val↑(Γ1(f)) = v = val
↓(Γ1(f)).
The existence of an optimal strategy for player I follows from the observation
that C is a closed and bounded subset of IRm (and hence compact), and that
the function min : IRm → IR taking the minimum coordinate is continuous. A
similar argument yields the existence of an optimal strategy for player II.
✷
Theorem 2.17 Let Γn(f) be a finite Blackwell game of length n. Then Γn(f)
is determined, and both players have optimal strategies.
Proof: We will proof this by induction on the length n of the games.
For n = 0, determinacy is trivial. So let n > 0, let Γn(f) be a finite Blackwell
game of length n, and suppose that all finite Blackwell games of length m < n
have already been shown to be determined, and to have optimal strategies. For
each position p ∈ W1, the game Γ(f, p) is finite of length ≤ n − 1. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis, each of those games is determined and has a value
val(Γ(f, p)). Define the payoff function g :W → IR by
g(p) = val(Γ(f, p)) for p ∈ W1 (B.41)
Then by Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem, the game Γ1(g) is determined.
Γ1(g) is by its definition an equivalent truncated subgame of Γn(f), so by
Corollary 2.21, Γn(f) is determined. Furthermore, by Remark 2.26 the opti-
mal strategy produced by Von Neumann’s Mini-Max Theorem can be extended
to an optimal strategy in Γn(f).
✷
B.3 Lebesgue Measurability from AD-Bl
Theorem 4.3 Assuming AD-Bl, it follows that all sets of reals are Lebesgue
measurable.
Proof: It suffices to show that the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] is complete. Set
X = Y = {0, 1}, and define φ : W → [0, 1] by
φ((x1, y1, x2, y2, . . .)) =
∞∑
i=1
2−i(xi ⊕ yi) (B.42)
where 0 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 0, 0 ⊕ 1 = 1 ⊕ 0 = 1. Now let σ, τ be strategies,
and suppose that one of those strategies is the strategy that assigns the 12 -
1
2
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probability distribution on X or Y , respectively. Then for any i ∈ IN , xi ⊕ yi
has equal chances of being 0 or 1, and the distribution of φ(w) on [0, 1] is the
uniform distribution on [0, 1] under the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. It follows
that for any subset S ⊂ [0, 1],
µinnerσ, τ (φ−1[S]) = µinnerλ (S) (B.43)
µouterσ, τ (φ−1[S]) = µouterλ (S) (B.44)
where µinner(A) = supB⊆A measurable µ(B), µ
outer(A) = infB⊇A measurable µ(B).
Let S ⊂ [0, 1]. No strategy for player I in the game Γ(φ−1[S]) can have value
greater than µinnerλ (S), since this is the lower expected income of any strategy
for player I against the 12 -
1
2 strategy. Similarly, no strategy for player II in the
game Γ(φ−1[S]) can have value less than µouterλ (S). Therefore
val↓(Γ(φ−1[S])) ≤ µinnerλ (S) ≤ µ
outer
λ (S) ≤ val
↑(Γ(φ−1[S])). (B.45)
From the determinacy of the game Γ(φ−1[S]), it now follows that
µinnerλ (S) = µ
outer
λ (S) (B.46)
Since this holds for arbitrary sets S ⊂ [0, 1], all subsets of [0, 1] are Lebesgue
measurable.
✷
C The Locally Optimal Strategy
As can be seen by inspection of the proof of Theorem 2.17, an optimal strategy
in a finite game is to use, at each position p, Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem
to generate the probability distribution for that position p. We do this by
calculating, for each position p, the optimal strategy for the one-round game
whose payoffs are the values of the games starting at the positions directly
following p.
In a non-finite game, we can do the same thing, i.e. for a given position p,
we can apply Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem to the one-round game whose
payoffs are the lowervalues of the games starting from the positions directly
following p. By Lemma 2.20, the value of this one-round game is equal to the
lowervalue of the game starting at p, giving us a relationship between lower-
values at different positions. In an open game, for player II, the strategy of
always using this ‘locally optimal’ probability distribution is an optimal strat-
egy (Remark 3.5). But this does not hold in general: see also Example 3.6 for
a counterexample.
As to why this ‘local optimality’ does not translate to optimality for the
whole strategy: a single probability distribution that is optimal in the corre-
sponding one-round game would be optimal in the whole game, if for any posi-
tion p following the current position, the strategy used in the subgame Γ(f, p)
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were optimal. But in order to use this to show that each of the separate prob-
ability distributions in the ‘locally optimal strategy’ is optimal in the whole
game, we would first need that the strategy as a whole is optimal in entire sub-
games, and for that we need that each of the separate probability distributions
is optimal in those subgames, and for that we need that the strategy as a whole
is optimal in entire subgames of subgames, etcetera, etcetera, ad infinitum. In
the case of finite games this eventually reduces to subgames of length 0, which
are trivial, but in the case of infinite games the proof falls through.
In general, it is impossile to construct an optimal or ǫ-optimal strategy
merely from the values a game has at each of its positions, as the following
example shows.
Example C.1 Consider the following two Blackwell games. Player II generates
a sequence of 0’s and 1’s. In the game Γ(S1), player II wins if he generates
infinitely many 1’s. In the game Γ(S2), player II wins if he generates only
finitely many 1’s. Player I has no influence over the outcome of the game.
Payoff is 1 if player I wins, 0 if player II wins.
It is clear that player II can win from any position, in both games. Hence
both games have lower and upper value 0, starting from all positions. But any
strategy for player II that is good in Γ(S1), will be bad in Γ(S2), and vice versa,
since the two sets of winning positions are complementary. Hence there cannot
be any method of finding optimal or good strategies that merely uses the values
of a game.
Note that here we have two sets of winning positions S1 and S2, such that
Γ(S1), Γ(S2) have value 0 (in all positions), and Γ(S1 ∪ S2) has value 1 (in all
positions).
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